"Three points above all should be evident.
First, the state is neither an ideal collective capitalist whose functions are determined in the last instance by the imperatives of economic reproduction nor is it a simple parallogram of pluralist forces. It is better seen as an ensemble of structural forms, institutions, and organisations whose functions for capital are deeply problematic. Second, the state's unity is as underdetermined at the level of state form(s) as accumulation is at the level of the value form. Thus, if accumulation strategies are needed to give a certain substantive unity and direction to the circuit of capital, state projects are needed to give a given state some measure of internal unity and to guide its actions. And, third, securing the conditions for capital accumulation or managing an unstable equilibrium of compromise involves not only a complex array of instruments and policies but also a continuing struggle to build consensus and back it with coercion. Taking these three points together, then, the state itself can be seen as a complex ensemble of institutions, networks, procedures, modes of calculation, and norms as well as their associated patterns of strategic conduct.
All this suggests in turn that the state cannot just be seen as a regulatory deus ex machina to be lowered on stage whenever the capital relation needs it. Instead the state itself must be an object as well as agent of regulation. However, whilst the list of formal elements may be the same, the particular elements involved, their substantive articulation, and their modus operandi will clearly be different as will the specific forces. This is what gives the political sphere its relative autonomy and means one cannot treat politics as 'concentrated economics'."
Bob Jessop (1990): Regulation Theories in Prospect and Retrospect, in: Economy & Society.
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